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Summary
INTRODUCTION: Methotrexate is used to treat many
medical conditions with medication schedules that differ
widely in dosage and frequency. The high potential of er-
roneous too frequent low-dose methotrexate prescriptions
leading to severe adverse reactions is well known;
however, documentation is mainly limited to case reports.
We reviewed all methotrexate prescriptions in a secondary
and a tertiary care hospital to analyse the incidence of too
frequent low-dose methotrexate prescriptions, and assessed
the quality assurance concepts implemented.
METHODS: All nononcological low-dose methotrexate
prescriptions issued for inpatients within 55 months were
analysed to identify too frequent prescriptions potentially
leading to harmful overdosing. Subsequently, clinical phar-
macologists reviewed all new methotrexate prescriptions
with resulting interventions at the physician level in the ter-
tiary care hospital. The impact of an interruptive alert dis-
played at methotrexate order entry was assessed in the sec-
ondary care hospital.
RESULTS: The incidence of too frequent prescriptions at
the tertiary hospital was 1.6% (five medication errors and
nine near misses in 888 inpatients). After introducing
checks by pharmacologists, two prescription errors were
intercepted during the 8 month quality assurance period.
At the secondary care hospital the incidence dropped from
2.5% (2/79, 20 months) to 0.8% (1/123, 35 months) after
the alert was implemented.
CONCLUSIONS: The incidences of erroneous too fre-
quent low-dose methotrexate prescriptions observed at
both hospitals were considered too high due to the high po-
tential for increased morbidity, mortality and costs. There-
fore, quality assurance measures were implemented and the
preliminary data show a positive impact on patient safety
for both approaches.
Key words: methotrexate; overdose; medication errors;
adverse drug reaction reporting systems; quality control;
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Introduction
Methotrexate is used in the treatment of many medical con-
ditions such as cancer as well as autoimmune diseases. In
addition, scheduling of doses varies widely, from cyclic-
al protocols for cancer chemotherapy (including high me-
thotrexate doses) to weekly administration for autoimmune
diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis and psoriasis (usu-
ally as low-dose methotrexate). Methotrexate is a high-risk
drug with a narrow therapeutic window, difficult dosing re-
gimens and dose adjustments to renal or hepatic organ in-
sufficiency and the patient’s condition. As a result of this
complexity, misunderstandings sporadically lead to seri-
ous incidents for patients, e.g. when methotrexate is ad-
ministered once every morning (mo) instead of once every
Monday (Mo) [1]. As a consequence, this overdosing may
result in serious adverse drug events from a broad range of
toxicities or, even death [2–4].
Methotrexate tops the list of high-risk drugs in the hospital
setting causing fatal medication errors, life-threatening
conditions, new or prolonged hospitalisations [5]. Frequent
incidents involving methotrexate prescriptions and even
fatal outcomes have been reported [2]. However, publica-
tions are mainly limited to case reports [1, 6–8] and, to the
best of our knowledge, no comprehensive studies about the
incidence of too frequent methotrexate prescriptions have
been published. In addition, the thorough retrospective ana-
lysis of methotrexate prescription errors is very laborious
because of the large number of prescriptions to be analysed
and the heterogeneity of regimens applicable.
Various initiatives have been undertaken to reduce erro-
neous prescriptions. In England, the Department of Health
defined the daily application of oral methotrexate as a
“never event” (a medication error that should never occur)
[9]. Multiple organisations have released recommendations
to prevent future incidents with methotrexate [10–12].
However, as far as we know, no study has been published
about the impact of methotrexate alerts before and after
implementation, or about strategies to realise methotrexate
alerts.
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Two cases of too frequent methotrexate administrations
were reported in 2014 to the Critical Incident Reporting
System (CIRS) at the University Hospital Zurich (USZ)
and one of these – a patient with febrile neutropenia –
was reported to the regional pharmacovigilance centre of
Zurich as a severe adverse drug reaction. Triggered by
these cases we conducted a comprehensive retrospective
analysis of the incidence of prescriptions for too frequent
methotrexate dosing in nononcological therapies in the
computerised physician order entry (CPOE) system at the
USZ. For the purpose of comparison, an equivalent ana-
lysis has been performed at the Hospital Simmental-Thun-
Saanenland AG (STS AG). To avoid too frequent metho-
trexate administrations a different quality assurance meas-
ure was implemented at each hospital. Finally, both con-
cepts were assessed for their impact on patient safety.
Methods
Tertiary care hospital (USZ)
We included all inpatients admitted to the USZ between
December 2nd 2009 and June 30th 2014 (55 months) and
retrospectively analysed all methotrexate medication or-
ders and administrations in the electronic health record.
Medication data from intermediate care, intensive care,
emergency room and operating room were not electronic-
ally available and were therefore excluded.
The USZ uses KISIM (CISTEC AG, Zurich, Switzerland)
as its CPOE system.
KISIM features a chemotherapy regimen calculation and
prescription tool which labels the generated methotrexate
prescription as chemotherapy. Those labelled orders were
also excluded from the analysis.
To detect too frequent methotrexate administrations we
computed the timespan of all consecutive planned admin-
istrations for each patient. Timespans of less than a week
were considered as too frequent. Finally, the identified
cases were processed manually to determine erroneous pre-
scriptions.
As a result of our retrospective analysis a quality assurance
programme was implemented at the USZ starting January
2015. This programme consists of a query for a daily list of
all new methotrexate prescriptions to be checked by clin-
ical pharmacologists. Methotrexate prescriptions in nonon-
cological patients were reviewed for daily dosing. If too
frequent dosing was observed, the attending physician was
directly contacted by the clinical pharmacologist by phone.
The data of the first 8 months were evaluated for a prelim-
inary assessment of the programme.
Secondary care hospital (STS)
We included all inpatients admitted to the STS between
December 2nd 2009 and June 30th 2014 (55 months). The
retrospective analysis was performed manually and in-
volved all methotrexate medication orders and administra-
tions in the electronic health record. Methotrexate chemo-
therapy prescriptions as well as medication data from in-
termediate care, intensive care, emergency room and oper-
ation room were electronically available but excluded from
this analysis.
The STS uses CGM PHOENIX (CompuGroup Medical
Schweiz AG, Niederwangen, Switzerland) as its CPOE
system.
At the STS a methotrexate alert has been implemented
since August 12th 2011 after there were several queries
about how to properly apply methotrexate in nononcologic-
al patients. The retrospective analysis compared the peri-
od without alert (20 months) and the period with alert (35
months) to assess the impact of the alert on reducing too
frequent prescription errors.
Chemotherapies and nononcological treatments are ordered
within different working areas of the CPOE system. The
implemented alert is triggered whenever methotrexate is
prescribed for nononcological patients. The alert is inter-
ruptive and informs the user that methotrexate is, as a rule,
ordered once a week. However, a too frequent prescription
is still possible without further notice.
Definitions
A medication error was defined as a failure in the treatment
process that leads to, or has the potential to lead to, harm to
the patient [13]. A prescription error is a failure in the treat-
ment process on the level of the prescription and an admin-
istration error is an error on the level of the administration.
A medication error is often, but not necessarily always, the
result of an erroneous prescription, i.e. the error occurred
on the administration level. A prescription error that was
subsequently corrected and therefore did not reach the pa-
tient was defined as a near miss.
Critical incident reporting system
At both hospitals, the critical incident reporting system
(CIRS) aims to learn from errors and near misses and to im-
prove healthcare services. Thus, employees may anonym-
ously report critical incidents with a standardised form on a
third party server via a secured internet connection. For pri-
vacy reasons the office of quality management and patient
safety anonymises name, time references and case specific
details prior to publishing the case on the intranet. Cases to
be reported are (1) near misses, (2) reversible harmful in-
cidents and adverse events, as well as (3) no-harm incidents
[14]. Cases with irreversible harm to the patient must not
be reported in the CIRS system. At this time cases poten-
tially relevant for pharmacovigilance are not automatically
forwarded to a designated registration office [15].
Pharmacovigilance
In Switzerland professionals and consumers may send re-
ports of adverse reactions to one of six regional centres
in Switzerland. These reports are forwarded to the Swiss-
medic national pharmacovigilance centre, which collabor-
ates with the international centre for drug safety run by the
World Health Organization. In accordance with the Law on
Therapeutic Products implemented on January 1st 2002, all
serious adverse reactions must be reported. Adverse reac-
tions are considered serious if they: (1) result in death, (2)
are life-threatening, (3) lead to or prolong hospitalisation,
(4) involve a persistent disability or incapacity, or, (5) are
otherwise to be considered medically significant. The mere
suspicion of causality between a reaction and a medicine
suffice to report an event; no proof is needed [16].
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Results
Tertiary care hospital (USZ)
In the 55-month period of our study, a total of 4 007 903
medication prescriptions were ordered for 172 709 inpa-
tients at the USZ, including 2 341 methotrexate prescrip-
tions ordered for 1 561 patients. From those methotrexate
prescriptions, a subset of 1 093 prescriptions was excluded
from further analysis because they were linked to chemo-
therapy. Among the remaining 1 248 prescriptions for 888
patients, we identified 67 cases with more than one planned
methotrexate administration per week. Next, clinicians and
clinical pharmacologists scrutinised the medical record for
each of the cases and identified 14 incidents that erro-
neously prescribed methotrexate too frequently, represent-
ing an incidence of 1.6% (14 prescription errors / 888 inpa-
tients). Finally, in five incidents the erroneous prescriptions
were not corrected and eventually led to medication errors
– i.e. methotrexate was administered too frequently – in-
cluding three incidents where major adverse events were
observed (fig. 1). In two of the major adverse events the
erroneous methotrexate prescription has been identified as
the pancytopenia inducing drug, resulting in a prolonged
stay of 7 days for one patient and a prolonged stay of 51
days including a 13 day intensive care unit admissions for
another patient. In the third major adverse event methotrex-
ate was not identified or suspected to be the causing drug
in a multimorbid patient. The remaining two medication
errors did not lead to harm to the patient and no adverse
events were observed.
Regarding prescription errors, daily methotrexate prescrip-
tions were the main source of errors (11/14). In two incid-
ents more than one prescription was involved and in one
incident a prescription with three administrations per week
(Mon, Wed, Fri) remained uncorrected.
In the first 8 months after the quality assurance programme
at the USZ started, clinical pharmacologists checked 652
methotrexate prescriptions ordered for oncological and
nononcological inpatients and outpatients. So far, two pre-
scriptions of too frequent methotrexate administrations
have been intercepted by the clinical pharmacologist (on
average one daily methotrexate prescription per 4 months).
In addition, eight prescriptions with flawed unit entries
(e.g. 1 mg instead of 1 tablet) and three double entries (e.g.
10 mg and 15 mg weekly) have been identified. However,
Figure 1
Analysis of the 67 cases with methotrexate administration intervals
shorter than a week at the University Hospital, Zurich.
the dosing of these prescriptions was rather low and none
of them posed a genuine short-term patient risk.
The number of anonymised incidents reported to the CIRS
System at the USZ and to the pharmacovigilance systems
show that two medication errors with adverse events had
been reported to the CIRS system and one case with ad-
verse reactions was reported to the pharmacovigilance sys-
tem. Medication errors without adverse events and near
misses were not reported.
Secondary care hospital (STS)
In the 55-month period of our study, 1 619 245 medication
prescriptions were ordered for 99 872 inpatients including
217 methotrexate prescriptions ordered for 202 inpatients.
Too frequent prescriptions were observed in three cases;
two cases occurred before (79 inpatients, 20-month period)
and one case occurred after (123 inpatients, 35-month peri-
od) the alert was installed. This implies a drop of the incid-
ence (errors/inpatient) from 2.5% (2/79) to 0.8% (1/123).
Further, in none of these cases was methotrexate admin-
istered too often, i.e. the prescription errors did not reach
the patients.
Discussion
In this quality control study all nononcological methotrex-
ate prescriptions were analysed in respect of too frequent
prescription in two Swiss hospitals: one for tertiary and one
for secondary care. The initial incidences of too frequent
low-dose methotrexate prescriptions were considered unac-
ceptable at both hospitals.
Both quality assurance measures implemented improved
patient safety. At the STS an interruptive alert was imple-
mented which appears at order entry for every nononcolo-
gical methotrexate prescription. The alert was implemented
in August 2011 after several, predominantly young, physi-
cians inquired about the proper application of methotrexate
in nononcological patients. This measure resulted in a drop
of the incidence of too frequent methotrexate prescriptions
from 2.5% to 0.8%.
At the USZ the incidence (errors/inpatients) of 1.6%
triggered a programme for quality checks by clinical phar-
macologists based on a daily list of all new methotrexate
prescriptions. The programme has been running for 8
months now and has successfully intercepted two cases
where methotrexate was prescribed too frequently. Besides,
the programme revealed that not only too frequent pre-
scriptions but also flawed dosing or unit entries were an
issue. Consequently, 8 prescriptions with incorrect dosing
were identified and subsequently corrected in cooperation
with the attending physicians. On average four prescrip-
tions (with a maximum of 12) were reviewed per day, res-
ulting in a significant increase in patient safety.
Several recommendations for safer methotrexate prescrip-
tions in CPOE systems have been published [10–12].
However, the implementation of these recommendations is
slow in hospital and pharmacy systems [17, 18], and, we
know of no report that compares the situation before and
after a methotrexate alert has been implemented. On the
one hand, methotrexate prescription regimens are very het-
erogeneous, which makes prescriptions prone to error and
Original article Swiss Med Wkly. 2015;145:w14218
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the development of specific and effective automated alerts
very challenging. On the other hand methotrexate displays
a narrow therapeutic range, with a potential for severe tox-
icity or even fatal outcomes in cases of accidental overdos-
ing [5]. Displaying information at every methotrexate order
entry may be criticised as being unspecific and therefore
inducing alert fatigue and systematic overrides. However,
methotrexate prescriptions are quite rare compared with
other drug prescriptions; young physicians especially are
often not familiar with the drug and could benefit from ad-
ditional decision support. More elaborate algorithms may
differentiate between oncological and nononcological ther-
apies and alert only when the time between two planed ad-
ministrations is less than 7 days. Additionally, such alerts
would also need to be able to deal with dosages split across
different days and dosages composed of tablets of different
strengths. In contrast to automated alerts, clinical pharma-
cologists’ interventions display higher sensitivity and spe-
cificity. Timely review of medications and punctual com-
munications with direct contact to clinicians decrease med-
ication errors and rates of adverse drug reactions [19, 20].
We realised that only a fraction of prescription errors were
reported to the CIRS at the USZ and one incident with an
adverse event was independently reported to the regional
pharmacovigilance centre. The direct flow of information
from CIRS to the regional pharmacovigilance centre might
deter professionals from reporting adverse events because
of fear of involvement in litigation. Near misses and crit-
ical incidents are usually part of CIRS and not reporting
them misses an opportunity for the organisation to learn
from errors before they reach the patient. Correcting pre-
scription errors is common practice in the healthcare pro-
cess and therefore health professionals may prefer to fo-
cus on urgent priorities instead of reporting near misses
[21]. Furthermore, spontaneous reporting systems are well-
known for their significant and widespread underreporting.
Reporting rates and quality are dependent on the initiative
and motivation of the reporters. However, the value of re-
ported incidents lies in signal detection and identification
of hazards on which to focus quality improvement activit-
ies [22].
Some limitations of the study need to be addressed. Too
frequent low-dose methotrexate administrations are not
only a problem in the hospital but also in the ambulatory
setting. Prescriptions of ambulatory patients are not entered
in our CPOE and were therefore not included in this study.
Further, this study focused on analysing and preventing
prescription and medication errors at the hospital. Factors
leading to such errors, e.g. misinterpretation of prescrip-
tions at hospital admission, were not addressed and could
be a field of interest in further studies. The reduction of
the incidence of prescriptions with too frequent administra-
tions could not be documented with statistical significance
and longer follow-up periods would be needed; i.e. despite
the fact that the number of incidents was considered much
too high for the hospitals and their patients, these numbers
were too low for inferential statistics. Both hospitals had
introduced CPOE long before the start of the study period.
Therefore, it was not possible to compare the incidences
before (ordering on paper) and after the implementation of
CPOE. No data exist regarding the incidence of methotrex-
ate prescription errors in the paper-ordering era. However,
CPOE with clinical decision support systems prevent med-
ication errors, as shown in several studies [23–25].
In conclusion, the initial incidences of too frequent low-
dose methotrexate prescriptions observed were considered
as unacceptable at both hospitals, since any accidental
overdosing of methotrexate has the potential for life-threat-
ening consequences. As a result, each hospital introduced
different quality assurance measures. Preliminary data
available indicate that both approaches implemented may
have an impact on patient safety. Clinical pharmacologists’
interventions were able to avoid two potentially severe me-
thotrexate prescription errors within 8 months. To assess
and compare different concepts of quality assurance,
however, long-term studies are needed for reasons of stat-
istical and medical significance.
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Figures (large format)
Figure 1
Analysis of the 67 cases with methotrexate administration intervals shorter than a week at the University Hospital, Zurich.
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